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STATE CONSTITUTIONS AS INTERACTIVE EXPRESSIONS OF
FUNDAMENTAL VALUES
Justin R. Long*
Given the terrifying attack in their recent history,1 it must be
comforting for Oklahomans to imagine that terrorism comes at
them from afar. False, but comforting. So perhaps we should not
be surprised to learn that when Oklahoma voters ratified a state
constitutional amendment2 barring their courts from ―look[ing] to
the legal precepts of other nations or cultures‖ or ―consider[ing]
international law or Sharia law,‖ they did so by an overwhelming
majority.3 In fact, some journalists attribute the amendment in
part to a partisan hope that its inclusion on the ballot would drive
up Republican voters’ turnout at the polls—presumably because
ordinary Oklahomans were even more enthused by this bigoted
proposal than they were by the local politicians.4

* Assistant Professor, Wayne State University Law School. A.B., Harvard University;
J.D., University of Pennsylvania School of Law. I thank Peter Hammer, Steve Winter, and
Chris Lund for helpful discussions at early stages of this essay.
1 For a description of the Oklahoma City terrorist bombing, see J.C. Oleson, ―Drown The
World‖: Imperfect Necessity and Total Cultural Revolution, 3 UNBOUND 19, 61–65 (2007)
(describing the 1995 attack on the Murrah Federal Building); see generally United States v.
McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 1998).
2 The amendment, which would add two new sections to Article VII, section 1 (the judicial
power section) of the Oklahoma constitution, comprises the following text:
B. Subsection C of this section shall be known as the ―Save Our State Amendment‖.
C. The Courts provided for in subsection A of this section, when exercising their judicial
authority, shall uphold and adhere to the law as provided in the United States
Constitution, the Oklahoma Constitution, the United States Code, federal regulations
promulgated pursuant thereto, established common law, the Oklahoma Statutes and
rules promulgated pursuant thereto, and if necessary the law of another state of the
United States provided the law of the other state does not include Sharia Law, in
making judicial decisions. The courts shall not look to the legal precepts of other nations
or cultures. Specifically, the courts shall not consider international law or Sharia Law.
The provisions of this subsection shall apply to all cases before the respective courts
including, but not limited to, cases of first impression.
Okla. CONST. art. 7, § 1, available at http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/
DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=84948 (last visited June 28, 2011).
3 Id. Over seventy percent of voters approved State Question 755. See Barbara Hoberock,
Injunction Issued on 755, TULSA WORLD, Nov. 30, 2010, at A1.
4 See James C. McKinley, Jr., Oklahoma Surprise: Islam as an Election Issue, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 15, 2010, at A12 (asserting that the ballot question helped increase Republican voter
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While the amendment itself is obviously a poisonous stew of
stupidity, fear, and hate, it cannot be blamed on the irrationalities
of state constitutional popular initiatives.5 The question was placed
on the ballot by Oklahoma legislators, who voted for it by 82-10 in
the House and 41-2 in the Senate.6 With such strong support for
the proposal in the legislature, a statute to the same effect would
likely have succeeded easily. So what did Oklahomans hope to
achieve by placing the text in the state constitution?
In this essay, I argue that the Oklahoma amendment offers an
example of the use of state constitutions to express and contest the
national community’s identity and defining values. In Part I, I
consider those values and their cultural context.7 Among the values
implicit in the amendment’s text is a profound ambivalence toward
American courts and the federal Constitution; ironically, the
extremism of the amendment all but guaranteed that courts would
play a central role as a forum for the debate on American identity
the amendment seeks to provoke. The amendment’s status as a
state constitutional text is crucial to both this court-denigrating
purpose and its court-elevating effect. In Part II, I show that the
political community at stake is national, as contemporary state
constitutional scholarship has argued.8 The state constitution
works here as a tool for the majority of Oklahomans to enact—that
is, to perform—their vision of what it means to be American, and
simultaneously to challenge their fellow citizens to adopt the same
values. Finally, I conclude that Oklahoma’s amendment echoes an
historic use of state constitutions to contest national values while
turnout).
5 See Sherman J. Clark, The Character of Direct Democracy, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
341, 352 (2004) (suggesting that ―direct democracy may encourage narrow and selfish
decision-making). See also Richard J. Ellis, Signature Gathering in the Initiative Process:
How Democratic Is It?, 64 MONT. L. REV. 35, 39–44 (2003) (describing, among other things,
how slight differences in wording—but not meaning—can account for the success or failure of
initiatives, how initiatives leave voters in a binary bind with no opportunity to vote for a
middle way, how initiatives need not reflect voters’ actual priorities at the time, and how
petition signature-gathering can hide the true supporters of a proposed initiative).
6 See
Bill Information for H.J.R. 1056 (2009–2010), OKLA. ST. LEG.,
http://newlsb.lsb.state.ok.us/BillInfo.aspx?Bill=HJR1056&Session=1000 (last visited June 28,
2011). Both the Senate sponsor, Senator Anthony Sykes, and the House sponsor, thenRepresentative Rex Duncan, are law school graduates; Duncan is now a local prosecutor,
recently deployed to Afghanistan by the Oklahoma National Guard. See Senator Anthony
Sykes—District 24, OKLA. ST. LEG., http://www.oksenate.gov/Senators/biographies/
sykes_bio.aspx (last visited June 28, 2011) (noting Sykes holds a J.D. from Oklahoma
University); Louise Red Corn, New DA Gets Orders to Deploy to Afghanistan, TULSA WORLD,
Feb. 16, 2011, at A11 (describing Duncan’s departure from his district attorney position).
7 See infra Part I.
8 See infra Part II.
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reflecting the power and potential of state constitutions today.9
PART I
The supporters of Oklahoma’s amendment seek to reflect and
install a particular conception of American identity; they seek to
define who is us and who is them, while asserting that that
definition has already been accomplished.10 The most telling
illustration of this comes from the two core sentences of the text:
―The courts [of Oklahoma] shall not look to the legal precepts of
other nations or cultures. Specifically, the courts shall not consider
international law or Sharia law.‖11
These sentences require judges to understand what ―other . . .
cultures‖12 are (non-white? non-Christian?), and if they do not, it
informs them that Sharia law is an example of legal precepts from
an ―other‖ culture.13
In this way, Muslim Americans who observe principles of Sharia
in Oklahoma are defined as fundamentally outside the political
community that authors the state constitution. By coincidence, the
lead plaintiff opposing enforcement of the amendment, Muneer
Awad, is a native-born American citizen and a graduate of the
University of Georgia Law School.14 For him, Sharia does not come
from an ―other‖ culture—it is his own, and therefore as American as
anything else about him.15 After all, as President George W. Bush
once explained, ―if you’re a Jew or a Christian or a Muslim, you’re
equally American.‖16 Not only the text, but also the authors’
subjective intent, marginalizes Muslim Americans. One of the
amendment’s authors, for example, has explained that the
amendment demonstrates ―an awakening of people concerned about
Christian values in our nation, and they are starting to express
themselves.‖17 Another legislative author of the amendment, Rex

See infra Part II.
See OKLA. CONST. art. 7, § 1(c).
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 See Donna Leinwand, More States Enter Debate on Sharia Law, USA TODAY, Dec. 9,
2010, at 3A, available at http://content.usatoday.com/dist/custom/gci/InsidePage.aspx?cId=
mycentraljersey&sParam=41613068.story (providing biographical details on Awad).
15 See id.
16 Press Release, White House, President Holds Press Conference (Nov. 4, 2004),
(transcript available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/11/
20041104-5.html).
17 McKinley, supra note 4.
9

10
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Duncan, defended the proposal on national television by positing
that America is a ―Judeo-Christian‖ nation.18 For these elected
officials, Sharia is not only apart from the religious values that
define ―our‖ nation, it is in opposition to them. Awad and Duncan
hold theologically incompatible religious views, which is common
enough in a pluralist society.
Duncan, however, seeks to
constitutionally define the political community not in terms of
―public reason,‖19 but in terms that exclude Awad and others who do
not share Duncan’s own social and theological identity. The ―farmer
and the cowman should be friends‖20 in Duncan’s Oklahoma, but not
with the imam.
My purpose here is not to defend, or even to examine, the merit of
Sharia legal principles (although their requirement that Muslims
obey the secular law of the land21 might present a paradox for a
Muslim judge under the amendment). I make no claim as to
whether any parts of Sharia are compatible or incompatible with
contemporary American legal principles. In practice, if a particular
precept of Sharia is lawful under American law, then by definition
there is no law to prohibit its application; if a precept conflicts with
American law, then its application is plainly unlawful and judges
acting in good faith will reject it. Entangling myself in Islamic law,
therefore, is not my project. Rather, I suggest here that the
Oklahoma amendment’s supporters are using their state
constitution to construct a political identity that rejects Muslim and
non-Christian participation.
The amendment also excludes foreign and international law from
a legitimate place in the political community; certainly, a classic
method for a group to define itself is by opposition to other groups.
This isolationism, bred of American exceptionalism, provokes
reasonable arguments about policy and positive law. But placing a
religious and cultural schema like Sharia in the same category as
foreign and international law (which the amendment’s authors
18 See Interview by Contessa Brewer with Rex Duncan, State Rep., (R) Oklahoma, MSNBC
(June 11, 2010), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ybvivrs_MH0 (last visited
June 23, 2011).
19 See Martin Rhonheimer, The Political Ethos of Constitutional Democracy and the Place
of Natural Law in Public Reason: Rawls’s ―Political Liberalism‖ Revisited, 50 AM. J. JURIS. 1,
2 (2005) (defining ―public reason‖ as the sort of political arguments that could obtain
consensus among people with differing philosophical commitments).
20 Richard Rogers & Oscar Hammerstein, OKLAHOMA! (1943).
21 See Muhammad ibn Adam, Obeying the Law of the Land in the West, DARUL IFTAA, Apr.
3, 2004, http://www.daruliftaa.com/question.asp?txt_QuestionID=q-18270572 (stating ―it is
necessary by Shariah to abide by the laws of the country one lives in, regardless of the nature
of the law, as long as it does not contradict Shariah‖).
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seem not to understand as distinguishable) cannot be supported by
any reasonable argument. Americans do not drive on the left or
vote for prime ministers; we simply are not constituted by those
expressions of foreign legal identity. On the other hand, some of us
do abstain from pork or pray five times daily, without ever shedding
the full status of citizenship.
With the ratification of this clause, a supermajority of
Oklahomans sought to encode a set of values in the constitution
defined by its antithesis in Sharia. One could read this approach as
an attempt to conserve the values already held by the people of the
state. In that light, the attempt is a failure because it inaccurately
mirrored the existing real community to the extent it ignored the
diversity of religious identities held by Oklahomans. On this
reading, Robert Schapiro’s critique of the plausibility of
independent state communities,22 paired with James Gardner’s
contemporaneous work on the same theme,23 would apply. The
Oklahoma amendment’s supporters may have viewed their state as
an autonomous, coherent culture that their amendment would
preserve. But this view is wrong. As Schapiro and Gardner
explain—and the very existence of an Oklahoma chapter of the
Center for American Islamic Relations confirms—all American
states are too diverse internally, and too similar externally, to claim
a unique culture of their own.
Read differently, however, the Oklahoma amendment is not a
descriptive project, but a prescriptive one. The amendment’s
description of Sharia as ―other‖ is thus aspirational and emotional,
rather than descriptive or rational. It reflects the majority of
Oklahomans’ hope that the day will come when Muslims are
recognized as not authentic participants in the political community.
―Save our [s]tate,‖24 they say, and everything hinges on the ―our.‖25

22 See Robert A. Schapiro, Identity and Interpretation in State Constitutional Law, 84 VA.
L. REV. 389, 411–13 (1998) (arguing that the use of state identity in constitutional
interpretation is flawed due to the difficulty of identifying a distinct state identity).
23 See James A. Gardner, Southern Character, Confederate Nationalism, and the
Interpretation of State Constitutions: A Case Study in Constitutional Argument, 76 TEX. L.
REV. 1219, 1227 (1998) (arguing that differences between southerners and Americans in
general are irrelevant to constitutional interpretation).
24 OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 1(B).
25 The illiberalism and oppression inherent in this hope explains why a Federal District
Judge had no trouble enjoining the amendment’s certification. See Awad v. Ziriax, No. Civ10-1186-M, 2010 WL 4814077, at *3, *9 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 29, 2010) (stating that ―the
amendment conveys an official government message . . . [that the Muslim plaintiff] is an
outsider, not a full member of the political community,‖ and prohibiting state election officials
from certifying, and thereby giving effect to, the amendment).
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By characterizing the Oklahoma amendment as ―aspirational,‖ I
use Robert Schapiro’s term of art for a constitution that expresses
communal values that the community itself has not fully achieved.26
In this view, state constitutions do not merely mirror the existing
philosophical commitments of an authentic political community; nor
do they impose value-neutral rules that simply structure the
political relations of de-situated selves.27 Instead, the expressive
power of the norms embedded in the constitutional text itself draws
a state polity together, creating a community of shared
commitments to the values in the text.28 Schapiro’s description of
aspirational constitutions includes the insight that the
constitutional values might be consistent with the values currently
dominant in the state, but they also might be an extension of those
values, or even at odds with them.29
To give practical effect to an aspirational constitution, the courts
play the most important role. Schapiro’s development of the concept
presents it foremost as a theory of state constitutional
interpretation, and the judiciary stands out as the dominant
interpretive institution.30 The judiciary is well-situated to the task
of interpreting aspirational constitutions because the judges’
independence permits them to decide cases in line with the
constitutional text, but against temporary political majorities. An
aspirational view of the Oklahoma amendment is consistent with its
content because the amendment targets courts and their
interpretive practices, just as Schapiro’s scholarship would suggest.
The amendment’s proponents could surely have included the
legislature and governor among the institutions prohibited from
relying on Sharia if the judiciary can be thus restricted.
Focusing the amendment on the judiciary causes several seeming
inconsistencies that further illustrate the expressive importance of
state constitutionalism to the amendment’s supporters.
For
example, the amendment on its face is designed to prohibit judges
who would otherwise find Sharia principles persuasive—judges who
the primary legislative sponsor inexplicably thinks would likely be
26 See Schapiro, supra note 22, at 393–94 (defining the aspirational aspect of state
constitutions).
27 See id. at 393 (rejecting the notion of a state as an authentic normative community).
28 See id.
29 See id. at 393–94 (noting how state constitutions may be consistent with values held in
the state, but also how constitution-drafters might use state constitutions to reject values
otherwise dominant in the state).
30 See id. at
429–30 (emphasizing the significance of judicial review in state
constitutionalism).
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―liberal activist[s]‖31—from using that interpretive resource. At the
same time, the amendment vests in the courts the sole power to
enforce its aspirational values (who else could correct a court if it
did apply legal precepts from ―other‖ cultures?), trusting the same
liberal activists who cannot be trusted to abide by conventional
American law to obey the Oklahoma constitutional amendment.
Reliance on judges to be their own check and balance seems so
incompatible with the purpose of the amendment that it provokes
the question of whether the amendment’s supporters ever expected
it to operate in real courts. The sponsors acknowledge that there
has never been a citation to Sharia in the history of Oklahoma
courts.32
Elsewhere, a New Jersey trial court decision that
mistakenly interpreted a Muslim defendant’s mens rea in light of
his interpretation of Sharia was reversed on appeal.33 In these
circumstances, even the most hysterical Islamophobe might realize
that the Oklahoma amendment is entirely unnecessary as a
constraint on Oklahoma courts.
But the aspirational values
embedded in state constitutions can serve a purpose beyond
regulating state government. State constitutions can also function
interactively in the national debate over American values.
PART II
―[T]his is a war for the survival of America. It’s a cultural war,
it’s a social war, it’s a war for the survival of our country,‖
amendment sponsor Rex Duncan told MSNBC, plainly indicating
his view of the anti-Sharia amendment as part of a national
agenda.34
Indeed, substantial support, in the form of radio
advertising and automated telephoning, for the Oklahoma
amendment came from the Florida-based ―Act! for America,‖ a
national group dedicated to opposing ―radical‖ Islam.35
The
amendment won recognition in prominent national media, including

31 Michael McNutt, Panel Set to Appeal Sharia Law Decision, OKLAHOMAN, Dec. 1, 2010,
at 5A (quoting former state Rep. Rex Duncan, R—Sand Springs).
32 See Nicholas Riccardi, Oklahoma May Ban Islamic Law; Backers Say It Isn’t a
Problem—but ―Why Wait?‖ Muslims Call the Bid a ―Scare Tactic,‖ L.A. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2010,
at A6 (reporting that amendment supporters knew Oklahoma courts had never cited Sharia).
33 See S.D. v. M.J.R., 2 A.3d 412, 27 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (reversing a trial
court that had based its refusal to grant a restraining order on the perpetrator’s mistake of
law due to what he perceived as Sharia).
34 Interview with Contessa Brewer, supra note 18.
35 See Riccardi, supra note 32. See also ACT! FOR AMERICA, http://www.actforamerica.org
(last visited June 28, 2011).
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Fox News,36 MSNBC,37 The New York Times,38 The Los Angeles
Times,39 and USA Today,40 among others. And at least six other
states have pursued similar laws.41 Even the litigation challenging
the amendment in federal court, whether ultimately successful or
not, brings attention from federal officials to the Oklahoma
amendment and its supporters’ vision for America.
Oklahoma’s use of its state constitution to contest Sharia
adherents’ status as full members of the American national
community is a vivid illustration of James Gardner’s theory of
interactive federalism.42 As demographic and cultural patterns
shift, Americans discomforted by the changes convert their sense of
loss and frustration into engagement with national values. Can we
really trust the federal Constitution to protect us from any vices
associated with the shifting cultural landscape? Can we trust our
institutions, especially the courts, to enforce the rights and
conventions we expect from the federal Constitution? Having
seemingly concluded that the answer to these questions is no,
Oklahomans adapted their state constitution to provide the
additional protection. The amendment they adopted sounds in
opposition to a conventional understanding of the national
prohibition on the establishment of religion, but altering that
conventional understanding would be a salutary effect for the
amendment’s supporters.
With Islam marginalized, the
supporters—in Oklahoma and across the country—could relax from
the fight to retain their (unacknowledged) privileged social status.
They can use their control of public institutions to confirm their own
sense of normative community.
The specific use of a state constitution for this purpose recalls a
similar project pursued in the 1800s.43 As waves of new immigrants
36 See Interview Transcript, Oklahoma Lawmaker Wants Sharia Law Banned, FOX NEWS
(June 21, 2010), available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,595026,00.html.
37 See Interview with Contessa Brewer, supra note 18.
38 See McKinley, supra note 4.
39 See Riccardi, supra note 32.
40 See Leinwand, supra note 14.
41 See id. (listing Arizona, Florida, Louisiana, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Utah as
having proposed similar laws).
42 See James A. Gardner & Jim Rossi, Dual Enforcement of Constitutional Norms, in
JAMES A. GARDNER & JIM ROSSI, NEW FRONTIERS OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: DUAL
ENFORCEMENT OF NORMS 8–9 (2011) (describing the mutual capacity of state and federal
governments to develop national constitutional norms). See generally JAMES A. GARDNER,
INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS: A JURISPRUDENCE OF FUNCTION IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM
(2005) (describing interactive federalism).
43 The story of the Blaine amendments described in this passage is derived primarily from
Kyle Duncan, Secularism’s Laws: State Blaine Amendments and Religious Persecution, 72

17_LONG.DOCX

2010/2011]

9/26/2011 8:50 PM

State Constitutions

1745

with an alien-seeming religion reached America, old-guard
Protestants felt their privileged status slipping away. Where today
Oklahomans, like Rex Duncan, view the courts as the iconic
battleground institution, for nineteenth century cultural
conservatives it was the schools. Public schools were under native
Protestant control, so the new immigrants responded by opening
and maintaining private religious schools where their own religious
traditions (traditions perceived as quite threatening to American
values) could be taught. In response, a paroxysm of xenophobic and
anti-Catholic bigotry swept the country. After a proposed federal
Constitutional amendment to ban the use of public funds for any
―sectarian‖ schools failed, states pursued the matter in their state
constitutions. Today, thirty-seven states include clauses (known as
―Blaine amendments‖ after their federal progenitor) barring the use
of public funds for any aspect of religious schooling.44
While the origins of Blaine amendments lay in bigotry, they did
not explicitly single out Roman Catholic parochial schools for
treatment any worse than other religious schools.45 And today,
public schools are federally protected from explicit domination by a
religious agenda, including that of Protestants.46 However, the
Blaine amendments remain as a stark example of how state
constitutions can serve as a weapon for electoral majorities
frightened of change in the American polity. Federal and state
governments influenced each other as competing social groups
jockeyed to use constitutional law alternately as a sword and a
shield for their own understanding of fundamental values.
Lawrence Sager has observed that ―there are simple and obvious
features of federalized governance that make it quite natural for
change of all kinds to originate in a minority of states, and if
successful, to propagate throughout the nation.‖47 This fluidity,
which comes from the mutually generative interaction of state and
federal constitutionalism, opens the door to moral progress for an
optimist like Sager. Even when the same interactivity permits
moral regression, state constitutions remain a vital legal resource
for the People to contest national values.

FORDHAM L. REV. 493, 493–96 (2003).
44 Id. at 493. Oklahoma’s Blaine Amendment is at OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 5.
45 See id.
46 See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 301 (2000) (holding that
prayers at a public school football game violated the Federal Establishment Clause).
47 Lawrence G. Sager, Cool Federalism and the Life Cycle of Moral Progress, in GARDNER &
ROSSI, supra note 42.

